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Exploring differences between private and public 
prices in the English care homes market 
 
Abstract 
This work quantitatively assesses the potential reasons behind the difference in 
prices paid by care home residents in England. Evidence suggests that the price paid 
by private payers is higher than that paid for publicly-supported residents, and this is 
often attributed to the market power wielded by local authorities as the dominant 
purchaser in local markets. Estimations of private prices at local authority level are 
used to assess the difference in price paid between private and public prices, the fees 
gap, using data from 2008 to 2010. Controlling for local area and average care home 
characteristics, the results indicate that both care home and local authority market 











Public funding of care home services for older people in England is on a means-tested 
basis. Those people who do not qualify for state-support (in full or in part) – generally 
paid through local authorities (LA-funded residents) – are obliged to fund their own 
care (self-funded residents). Most care homes will take residents from either funding 
source, although a small minority of care homes focus solely on the self-funding 
sector of the market. 
The prices paid by self-funded residents are usually higher than the fees paid for LA-
funded residents. A recent report published by the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA, 2017) found that fees for self-funded places in England were on 
average 43 per cent higher than those paid by LAs, and that this varied by region 
(from 23% in the North East to 52% in the South East). Older evidence from the Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT, 2005) suggested that around 20 per cent of care homes charged 
self-funded residents more than LA-funded residents for similar conditions, while 
other published reports find price differentials in the region of 25-43 per cent 
(NatWest, 2016). A price differential is also found in the US nursing home market, 
where public (Medicaid) pay rates are around 70 per cent of private pay rates 
(Mukamel and Spector, 2002; Grabowski, 2004).  
Despite there being evidence of a fees gap in England between publicly supported 
and self-funded residents, identifying the potential influences causing price 
differentials are under-researched. This is partly due to the fact that whilst (average) 
prices paid by local authorities are publically available, little has been known about 
the prices that self-funders pay for their care home places. Only recently has there 
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been information about self-funder prices but predominantly at regional and 
national level (CMA, 2017). 
This paper makes several contributions to the debate around the fees paid by 
different funding types in the English care homes market. First, we calculate average 
self-funder prices at the LA-level. This provides valuable information at a more 
granular level than is currently available. In calculating LA-level self-funder prices, we 
take into account NHS-funded nursing care payments, out-of-area placements (one 
LA funding a resident in a care home located in another LA), outlier costs, LA-funded 
resident proportions and missing price data. Secondly, having both average LA fees 
and average self-funder fees we are able to estimate the gap in fees paid by LAs for 
residents eligible for support and by self-funded residents and take account of the 
different factors that affect it at the LA-level. In doing so, we set out a conceptual 
framework that can be used to discuss how the interplay between the market power 
of both LAs and providers could play a role in the differences in fees paid. 
Furthermore, contrary to previous studies, we have a panel dataset that covers years 
2008 and 2010 and therefore can use panel data models in the empirical estimation 
to account for time-invariant heterogeneity. Price differences across payer types are 
examined at the Local Authority (LA) level, where, broadly speaking, public 
commissioning decisions are made.  
Finally, this study is important from a policy point of view. It provides a framework of 
how key market factors could influence the fees gap and therefore how policy 
changes such as cuts to social care budgets can feed into the market. If, for example, 
LAs’ dominant market position is an important explanation of the fees gap then 
 3 
 
prices for LA-funded residents can be expected to be pushed down as a result of the 
financial pressure on LAs. Providers in distress due to lower LA fees (and also rising 
costs) consequently become more reliant on the private segment of the market. 
Depending on the presence of other market characteristics that affect the fees gap, 
providers may increase self-funder prices to cross-subsidise LA-funded residents. At 
worst, we could observe more care home closures and greater polarisation of 
services between affluent and less affluent areas (Office of Fair Trading, 2005; County 
Councils Network and LaingBuisson, 2015). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the English 
care homes market and there follows a conceptual model that frames the empirical 
analysis. The data and empirical approach are described and the results are then 
presented and discussed.  
The English care homes market 
The English care homes market for older people consists of over 11,000 independent 
sector (for- and not-for-profit) care homes (CMA, 2017). The sector is fragmented 
and shows very low market concentration, consisting primarily of many single home 
or small multi-home organisations and fewer large corporate chains (Forder and 
Allan 2011). Care home capacity (i.e. the number of available beds) is relatively fixed 
in the short term (Forder, Knapp & Wistow, 1996) and the cost structure suggests 
that keeping occupancy rates high, usually around 90%, is important for care homes 
because it is hard to reduce costs if beds remain unfilled (CMA, 2017).  
The care homes market consists of two distinct demand streams, self-funded and LA-
funded residents.1 Qualifying for LA-funding depends on being able to meet eligibility 
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criteria for both needs and financial assets. The LA portion of the market is a quasi-
market (Bartlett et al., 1994). Self-funders in residential care are either those that do 
not qualify for LA-funded care based on needs or financial eligibility, or those that 
choose to not ask for help from their LA when it comes to funding residential care 
(Forder, 2007). On the whole, the self-pay market can be regarded as a conventional 
market where self-payers are free to choose their preferred home taking into 
account factors such as fees, quality and location (Forder and Allan 2014). In practice 
however, the choice of care home is often made quickly, under pressure and, for at 
least some, with limited choice, especially for those who have a complex set of needs. 
It is usually a ‘distressed purchase’, made after a change in circumstances (e.g. a 
deterioration in health). This behaviour, together with a lack of transparency 
concerning care home fees and quality in the self-funder market (CMA, 2017), 
suggests that care homes may enjoy a certain degree of market power. Evidence 
from UK and US studies do suggest that care homes have at least some market power 
(Nyman, 1989; Forder, 2000; Mukamel and Spector, 2002).  
Placement decisions for those eligible for council financial support are made by a 
social worker or care manager, and, in theory, as long as the placement is within the 
‘usual price’ that the LA is willing to pay and meets minimum quality standards, LA-
funded residents have a choice over which homes they prefer.  
Care homes are regulated for quality by national regulators, but there is no regulation 
of prices in the English care homes market (Forder and Allan, 2011). Prices will 
therefore be determined in the market from the interaction of the different players 
and their relative market power (care homes, LA commissioners and self-funders). As 
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noted earlier, care homes are likely to have a certain degree of market power over 
self-funders due to the nature and timing of the decision and asymmetric 
information. Similarly, LAs often appear to have a degree of market power due to 
their purchasing power and better information they have around fees, quality and 
services of care homes. Commissioners usually negotiate with care homes that are 
prepared to offer services in line with the local council payment rate. Individual 
placements for LA-supported residents are then made on the basis of these terms 
and LA commissioners focus on finding vacancies in care homes with acceptable 
quality levels. Given that quality is not likely to matter greatly above some minimum 
level, competition between care homes for LA-funded residents is likely to be focused 
on price. LAs are likely to secure lower fees compared to self-funders, but it is not 
always clear whether that is because of their dominant position in the market (Laing 
2008; Laing, 2014). Supply side market characteristics, such as the number and the 
location of care homes in the market are also expected to affect care home market 
power both over LA councils and self-funders and consequently equilibrium prices.  
 
Conceptual model 
Given the institutional characteristics of the care homes market outlined in the 
previous section, the model that best describes competition in this market is that of 
monopolistic competition with horizontal and vertical differentiation. In line with this 
model, entry into the market is free up to the point where average profits are zero, 
yet there is also a degree of price dispersion, compatible with the presence of market 
power (Gaynor and Town, 2011). Following Forder and Allan (2014) the market can 
be described as follows. 
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Each care home 𝑖 has the following profits function 𝜋𝑖: 











𝑘 are the prices and 𝑥𝑖
𝑘  the demand from councils (𝑘 = 𝑐) and self-funders 
(𝑘 = 𝑠) respectively. Demand for care home services depends on care home location 
(𝑑𝑖) and quality (𝑞𝑖) as well as the level of disability and needs (𝜎𝑖) in the population 
and the wealth (𝜃𝑖) of service users in the market. Because of the means-testing of 
public support higher wealth will have a positive effect on self-funder demand and a 








< 0. Care homes set 
quality at or above the minimum regulated quality level (𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝑞). Marginal and fixed 












> 0 and 𝐹 (𝑞) = 0. 
The council price is set following a collective bargaining process as: 
𝑝𝑐 = 𝜌(𝑁) = 𝑐𝑖(𝑞) + 𝜂(𝑁) (2) 
where 𝜂(𝑁) is a market power function with 𝜂𝑁 ≤ 0 capturing the degree of market 
power to raise prices above marginal costs as a function of the number of 
competitors in the market. Care homes are then left to choose self-funder price and 
quality (after choosing location). The optimal quality and price solving for the first 
order conditions, in partial reduced form, become: 𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝑞𝑖
∗(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖) and 𝑝𝑖
𝑠∗ =
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∗(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖). The equilibrium LA fee becomes 𝑝𝑖
𝑐∗ = 𝜌∗(𝑁𝑖, 𝑑𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜃𝑖). Prices and 
quality are therefore determined in equilibrium as a function of the number and 
location of competitors, needs and wealth in the market. 
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Provider and LA market power 
There are a number of reasons why we may observe a price dispersion in this market, 
with self-funder prices being higher than LA fees. First, as outlined above, care homes 
have market power over self-funders. In particular, information asymmetries are a 
source of market power for providers – this can support price discrimination between 
self-funders and LA-funded residents for the same (quality) product (Akerlof, 1970; 
Stiglitz, 1979; Diamond, 1971; Salop, 1976; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Salop, 1977). 
Otherwise, in competitive markets, both prices would be driven to normal profit 
levels. Self-funders will face significant (search) costs acquiring information with 
respect to service provision, prices and quality of care homes. Further, decisions over 
care home placements are predominantly made at times of distress. 
The price dispersion may also be explained by the collective bargaining process taking 
place between council purchasers and care homes and their relative market power. 
On the one hand, for a given level of needs in the market, LAs often have a big 
purchasing position in the market and better information around care home fees and 
quality. At the margin, LAs looking to place a new resident could have a very large 
market power if many care homes in the local market have available beds (excess 
supply). Ultimately, the greater the level of competition for that new placement, the 
lower will be the price paid by the LA (
𝜕𝜌𝑐∗(𝑁)
𝜕𝑁
< 0). In addition, LAs may secure price 
discounts for ‘bulk purchases’ from care homes that, in the presence of economies 
of scale, want to reach optimal scales of operations or deal with uncertainty about 
local demand and low occupancy rates. At the extreme, LAs may be able to secure 
placements even below the marginal cost in which case care homes may have to 
cross-subsidise by charging self-funding residents even higher prices (Hancock and 
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Hviid, 2010). However, given that many care homes are chiefly, or totally, reliant on 
LA-funded residents, particularly for certain regions, it would be unrealistic to 
assume that LAs pay fees below marginal cost for all placements (CMA, 2017; Laing, 
2014).  
On the other hand, LAs are likely to face pressures to meet increasing demand for 




> 0) and/or in areas 




< 0) and risk facing supply shortages if they push prices 
too low. If care homes in the local area have limited capacity to take on new 
residents, this in turn will alter the bargaining power dynamic in the market (excess 
demand). Overall, we expect that the relative market power between councils and 
care homes will, ceteris paribus, depend on the relative sizes of the self-pay demand 
and LA-supported demand as well as the intensity of competition in the market.  
There are other potential explanations for price differentials between payer types, 
but these may be more difficult to assess at local market-level. First, vertical quality 
differentiation where self-funders have a preference for higher quality, potentially 
even in the same care home. With significant heterogeneity of preferences for quality 
(given price) among consumers, price (Bertrand) competition will lead to markets 
that are characterised by a range of qualities and prices at marginal costs 
(Belleflamme & Peitz, 2015). Homes with higher quality would have higher (marginal) 
costs, and so observed price differences could still be explained even with prices set 
at marginal cost. As noted earlier, self-funders are more likely to place higher weight 
on quality compared to LAs when supporting residents.  
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Individual spend-down of assets can also account for price differences between self-
funded and LA-funded residents. Troyer (2002) found that self-payer rates in Florida 
nursing homes were higher than Medicaid rates because of an inter-temporal 
premium, i.e. to cover the potential spend down of assets to qualify for (unprofitable) 
Medicaid coverage. A proportion of social care users in England will face very large 
social care costs across their lifetimes (Commission on Funding of Care and Support, 
2011). However, length of stay in English care homes is relatively short in general, 
although higher for self-funders. Two studies, one of publicly-funded residents in 
three local authorities and another of Bupa care homes including both payer types, 
found average stays of 18 months and 26 months, respectively (Steventon and 
Roberts, 2012; Forder and Fernandez, 2011).   
Following this discussion we see that self-funder and LA fees and the resulting fees 
gap will be determined in equilibrium by a number of supply and demand side 
characteristics. Holding other market characteristics fixed (such as population needs 
levels, care home quality, and economies of scale) the fees gap at the LA-level is likely 
to be affected by the interplay between care homes and councils’ relative market 
powers. We can expect that higher competition will have a negative effect on both 
self-funder and LA fees. The overall effect on the fees gap is not clear a priori since 
price competition is expected to be stronger in the LA-funded portion of the market 
but mark-ups are higher for self-funders. The impact of wealth on the fees gap is also 
ambiguous. Self-funded and LA-funded price should both rise as wealth increases, 
the former from increased spending power and the latter from reduced bargaining 
power of LAs. 
 10 
 
Data and empirical approach 
Data 
Care home-level data is taken from a panel of all care homes in England and then 
averaged at the LA-level. Broadly, the panel was created from matching the CQC 
register of care homes for May 2008 and September 2010 to price data from Laing & 
Buisson. The Laing & Buisson prices directory contains minimum and maximum prices 
per week by room type (single and other) and client-type (nursing or residential). A 
mean price was constructed by taking the average of minimum and maximum price 
for the service (client and room) types available in the home. Information on the 
number of beds of each type for each home was not available. 
Both the costs to, and number of residents funded by, LAs were obtained from 
council-level unit costs reports available from the Health and Social Care Information 
Centre (now NHS Digital). Data on LA-level characteristics were obtained from the 
Office for National Statistics.  
Data from 2008 to 2010 was used for three primary reasons. First, data on price has 
become increasingly scarce over time. For example, the report from CMA (2017) on 
the care homes market has price data for 6,727 older people care homes (59.6% of 
all homes aimed at older people) and used a further restricted sample of 26 larger 
care home providers operating 2,000 homes to estimate fees differences between 
self-funded and LA-funded residents. For 2010, we have price data for 9,126 
independent sector care homes (95.0% of all independent sector care homes aimed 
at older people at that time).2 For 2008 the same figures are 7,420 and 79.6%, 
respectively. Second, we have data for out-of-area placements for 2009 provided by 
CQC, which is key to knowing where LA-funded residents were being supported and 
 11 
 
therefore generating appropriate estimated prices (see Table A1 in Appendix). 
Finally, previous research has shown that the cross-subsidisation issue that exists in 
the care homes market currently was in existence in the period examined (Forder 
and Allan, 2014).  
Estimating LA-level average self-funder price 
We assume that the observed (average) price (per week) for a place in an 
independent care home is a function of the cost (price) per LA-funded resident 
located in the LA and the price per self-funded resident: 
𝑃𝑗 = 𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴 + (1 − 𝑛𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑆𝐹    (3) 
Where 𝑃𝑗 is the (average) care home price, 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴 is the (average) cost per LA-funded 
resident located in the Local Authority, 𝑛𝑗  is the proportion of residents funded by 
(any) LAs in LA 𝑗, and 𝑃𝑗
𝑆𝐹  is the (average) price of a self-funded place.  






      (4) 
Estimating 𝑛𝑗 is not straightforward. This is for two reasons. The first is that we need 
the total number of residents in care homes to be able to work out the proportion of 
residents that are LA-funded, something that is unknown. The second is that LA-
funded residents may be funded by one LA but located in another (out-of-area 











𝑗  is the number of LA-funded residents that are funded by LA 𝑖 and located 
in LA 𝑗, 𝛿 is the assumed occupancy rate, and 𝐵𝑗 is the total number of places in LA 𝑗. 
We estimate self-funder prices for 150 LAs for 2008 and 2010.3 The details of the 
estimation process, the raw data used to calculate self-funded prices by LA, and the 
estimated values are presented in the Appendix.  
Given the information available, there were a number of issues that arose when 
estimating average self-funder prices at the LA-level, and therefore the estimated 
fees-gap as a consequence. First, a number of LAs (ten LA observations across the 
two years for eight LAs, see Appendix) had an estimated proportion of LA-funded 
residents over 1. These were London boroughs in all but one case (Thurrock, which 
adjoins London). As a result, we exclude these LA observations from the analysis as 
it is very unlikely that there would be a market for self-funded residents in these LAs. 
A number of the estimated average self-funded prices for the remaining LAs were 
clearly outliers (See Figure A1, appendix). This was for a number of reasons; for 
example, where there are a (very) high proportion of LA-funded residents in the LA 
then the estimated self-funded price will be (extremely) high. 
We attempted to resolve some of these issues in two ways: first, average regional 
costs were used in place of LA-level average costs: and second, the proportion of 
residents that are LA-funded, 𝑛𝑗 , was changed to the 95
th (5th) percentile for those 
LAs with very high (low) 𝑛𝑗 .  
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Estimating LA-level average fees gap 
There were still a number of outlier self-funder prices even with the changes outlined 
above (see Figure A2 in Appendix). Therefore, for those LAs where we believe there 
is a market for self-funded residents but where the estimated self-funder price is 
unrealistic the fees gap is in effect ‘missing’. We could assume that the missing data 
is entirely random. However, we can use multiple imputation (MI) to ignore the exact 
process that led the data to be missing. We imputed an adjusted fees gap for those 
LAs with 𝑛𝑗  above (below) the 90
th (10th) percentile (0.738 and 0.387, respectively) 
and for those LAs that had greater than 20 per cent of care homes not reporting any 
price data (which could influence the observed average price particularly for LAs with 
relatively few homes).4  
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for the final sample of LAs for 
2008 and 2010. Table 1 shows the various per week fees gaps between the average 
price paid by self-funded residents and LA-funded residents, respectively. The basic 
fees-gap is measured as the difference between the estimated basic, unadjusted, 
self-pay price and the average cost paid by LAs for a place in a care home provided 
by others (corrected for out-of-area placements). The adjusted fees gap is the 
difference between the adjusted self-pay price and the regional average cost paid for 
a place in a care home provided by others. This is our preferred measure of the price 
difference.  
As robustness checks three other measures of the fees gap are included: where the 
adjusted average self-funded price is estimated based on 85 per cent or 95 per cent 
occupancy rates; and where we assume that self-funded residents and LA-funded 
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residents pay the average maximum and minimum price observed in each LA, 
respectively (assuming a 90 per cent occupancy rate, as the basic and adjusted fees 
gaps do).5 The non-imputed data show a range for the average (per week) fees gap 
of £170 to £196, with the preferred, adjusted, fees gap being £180. Self-funders pay 
on average 33.8%-38.9% more than LAs pay to support residents. For the imputed 
data the same figures are £147 to £176 and £162, respectively, indicating that self-
funders pay 29.3%-35.1% more than LAs pay to support residents. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the 
analysis. As a proxy for LA marker power we use an inverse measure of wealth, 
specifically the percentage of those eligible that claim pension credit in a LA, an 
income benefit for older people. The level of care home competition is measured 
using the average level of LA competition. This is the average of a 10-km distance- 
and time-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each care home in the LA 
(an inverse measure of competition, HHI = 0 implying perfect competition and HHI = 
1 implying monopoly).6 Needs are measured using the percentage of the older 
population claiming attendance allowance. The additional control variables are a 
measure of care home quality, the percent of homes rated as good or excellent in 
the LA;7 for economies of scale the average size of care homes in each LA, the 
percentage of the total population that are over state pension age (as a measure of 
demand); the percentage of care homes in the LA which are primarily aimed at clients 
with dementia, that are nursing homes and are in the voluntary sector, respectively; 
and then two dummy variables to indicate whether the LA was a London borough 
and whether the observation came from 2010. The former was included to control 
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for the higher prices (and wages) associated with London and the latter to control for 
any potential differences between years, e.g. potential methodological differences 
in LA data returns.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Empirical specification 
From the conceptual framework outlined in section 3 we can estimate the following 
model of the fees gap: 
𝐹𝐺𝑗𝑤  (= 𝑝
𝑆𝐹 − 𝑝𝐿𝐴) = 𝐹𝐺𝑗𝑤(𝑁𝑗𝑤 , 𝑞𝑗𝑤,𝜃𝑗𝑤 , 𝜎𝑗𝑤) + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑤  (6) 
Where 𝐹𝐺 is the fees gap for LA 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 150) in wave 𝑤 (𝑤 = 1, 2), 𝑝𝑆𝐹 is 
average self-funder price and 𝑝𝐿𝐴 average LA-funded price, 𝑁 is the level of 
competition in the local market, 𝑞 the level of quality, 𝜃 the level of wealth in the 
market and 𝜎 represents local needs levels. 𝛿𝑗 is a time-invariant, LA-specific, error 
term and 𝜖𝑗𝑤the classical disturbance, both assumed to have mean of zero and 
constant variance, and the latter error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
time-invariant error term and the regressors of interest. Initially we estimate 
equation (6) using OLS, therefore assuming that the error terms are not correlated 
over time. We then estimate the model using random effects GLS to allow for the 
panel nature of the data.  
We estimate models on both the imputed and non-imputed (casewise deletion) data, 
the latter for comparison. Estimations on the imputed data set used Rubin’s rules to 
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calculate coefficients and standard errors and were undertaken using the MI suite of 
commands available in Stata 15. 
Results 
Results of the estimation of equation (6) by using the non-missing data are 
presented in Table 3, whilst the results using data drawn from multiple imputation 
are presented in Table 4. In all estimations, to examine the relationship between 
providers and LAs the measures of competition and pension credit uptake are 
interacted. Standard errors in the results from Table 3 are bootstrapped (500 reps), 
and in all estimations (Tables 3 and 4) standard errors allow for correlation between 
observations from the same LA.  
We assess the specification of the models in the following ways. The Breusch-Pagan 
test of the null hypothesis that there are no random effects present in the model is 
rejected for the models using casewise deletion. We test for the significance of 
random effects in MI regressions by applying the Breusch-Pagan test for random 
effects on each imputation. Irrespective of the fees-gap estimated, for all 20 
imputations the null hypothesis of the B-P test was rejected (all at the 1 per cent 
level). Further, for both the non-imputed and imputed models, the Hausman test 
confirms that the random effects model outlined in equation (3) is correctly 
specified, except for columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.  
In Table 3 the OLS cross section results for the basic and adjusted fees gap are 
presented in columns 1 and 2, whilst columns 3 and 4 present random effects GLS 
for the basic and adjusted fees gap, respectively. The results show that competition 
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strongly reduces the fees gap (given the inverse measuring of competition from HHI) 
whilst lower wealth does not significantly reduce the fees gap. 
The results of Table 3 could be due to the large level of missing observations. 
Therefore Table 4 presents estimations of random effects GLS using multiple 
imputation (20 imputations). Each of the columns presents the results for various 
specifications of the dependent variable: 5 the basic fees gap; 6 the adjusted; 7 and 
8 adjusted assuming 85 per cent and 95 per cent occupancy, respectively; and 9 
adjusted using minimum and maximum prices for LA-funded and self-funded 
residents, respectively. 
The results from our preferred specification, when we have adjusted prices and 
addressed missing prices using multiple imputation, are found in column 6. Looking 
at these, it is clear that competition plays a role in the fees gap with reductions in 
competition increasing the fees gap significantly. Decreases in wealth, measured 
using pension credit, have a significant negative correlation with the fees gap. The 
significant interaction effect between competition and wealth indicates that the 
impact of (a lack of) competition is mitigated by levels of wealth; for a given level of 
wealth, decreases in competition reduce the fees gap.  
Looking at the other variables included in the model, no significant effect on the fees 
gap was found for average care home size or quality. A higher prevalence of older 
people and needs both have a significant negative correlation with the fees gap, 
whilst increased prevalence of nursing homes and not-for-profit homes have 
significant positive correlations with the fees gap. A one percentage point increase in 
nursing homes and not-for-profit homes lead to a higher fees gap by £1.57 per week 
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and £2.19 per week, respectively, the former significant at 10%. Finally, there is also 
a significant positive year effect with the fees gap being £39 per week higher in 2010 
compared to 2008. Most of the results are robust to changes in the fees gap that is 
analysed.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Given the interaction of competition and wealth, Table 5 presents the marginal 
effects of competition on the fees gap for various values of pension credit, with other 
variables at their means, for the estimations from columns 3-6 of Tables 3 and 4. The 
results suggest that decreases in competition from the mean (i.e. increases in HHI) 
have less effect on the fees gap as wealth decreases. At the median level of pension 
credit, a 1% increase in competition will decrease the fees gap by £29 per week in 
the preferred specification, although this effect is only significant at 10%. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
In addition to the robustness checks included in the main tables, we also performed 
two further specification checks. First, there could be misspecification of the data if 
we have incorrectly assumed that the fees gap cannot be negative in value. However, 
a random effects Tobit, with the fees gap censored at zero, does not alter the results. 
Second, including the excluded LA observations in the analysis, and thus assuming 





The extent of the gap in fees paid by LA-funded and self-funded residents is well 
known and is often attributed to the dominant purchasing power of LAs. However, 
there is little evidence of average self-funded fees paid at the LA-level and little 
quantitative exploration to assess what influences the gap in fees paid by self-funded 
and for LA-funded residents. We estimated the average self-funded fee for LAs for 
2008 and 2010 using data on average resident price and average LA-funded resident 
cost. We then assessed the potential causes of the fees gap between self-funded and 
LA-funded resident fees. 
The estimates for average (weekly) self-funded price have controlled for out-of-area 
placements, nursing care contributions, missing price data, and high proportions of 
LA-funded residents in an LA. We find an average fees gap of £162 per week (range 
£147-£196) for the period 2008-2010, a relative difference of 32.3% (range 29.3%-
38.9%). The CMA (2017) report on the care homes market found an average fees gap 
of £245 per week, or 43%. The difference could reflect the data used, i.e. the CMA 
figures on the fees gap used data on prices for a sample of homes and providers, 
whereas our estimates of the fees gap are at LA-level using estimated self-funder 
prices and LA-level publicly funded price data. Alternatively, the difference could be 
explained at least in part by both wage inflation and the continued squeeze in LA-
funding over the ensuing period, and overall we believe our estimates are plausible.  
Nevertheless, the estimates in this analysis will only be as good as the data used. The 
price data used to estimate average care home price is based on minimum and 
maximum prices and no weight is given in terms of the proportion of residents paying 
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each price (nor prices in between). Further, a number of simplifying assumptions 
were made. For example, we have used data for 2009 out-of-area placements, and 
so have assumed that out-of-area placements were exactly the same over the period 
2008-2010. A more likely concern is that LA-cost data may be skewed by the inclusion 
(or exclusion) of overhead costs which differ amongst LAs. The use of regional 
average LA-cost fees in self-funded fees estimates are hoped to solve at least some 
of this problem. Further, we used MI methods to address missing fees gap data. The 
use of MI assumes the data is missing at random (MAR), i.e. the missing data is 
independent of unobserved data given the data that is observed. If this assumption 
is violated the data is missing not at random (MNAR) and the results of MI 
estimations will be biased to some extent (Carpenter and Kenward, 2013).  
Taking the data limitations into account, we find that provider competition and 
wealth have a significant negative correlation to the fees gap. Given our expectations 
on how these factors will influence market prices, these negative effects suggest, in 
absolute terms, that the impact of increased competition is more strongly felt on self-
funder fees than LA-funded fees and for wealth the impact is greater on LA-funded 
fees. 
We also find that increases in demand, either from a larger population base or 
greater needs, reduces the fees gap; this suggests that self-funded fees are more 
responsive to changes in market conditions than fees that are LA-funded. The results 
suggest no effect of quality on the fees gap, although the interpretation of this effect 
is difficult given the challenges involved in measuring quality at LA-level. Similarly, 
our proxy for economies of scale, average care home size, did not increase the fees 
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gap. However, larger proportions of nursing homes did increase the fees gap. This is 
found in spite of controlling for weekly nursing care payments in estimating self-
funder prices and so could potentially be capturing an economies of scale effect as 
nursing homes tend to be larger on average than residential care homes (Laing, 
2014). We additionally found that larger numbers of voluntary sector homes increase 
the fees gap. This is unsurprising given that the voluntary sector generally have higher 
costs and a greater level of quality (Grabowski and Hirth, 2003; Mukamel et al., 2005; 
Forder and Allan, 2014). 
We also find a significant increase in the fees gap over time, even after controlling 
for inflation. This could be explaining differences in data over the two years, for 
example the way LAs calculated their costs. However, potential alternatives as to 
what this is capturing include the squeeze on LA expenditure and number of 
residents supported at this time (Fernandez and Snell, 2012; Fernandez et al., 2013), 
which would have important implications given the current policy climate and 
continued funding constraints (see below), that care homes used their market power 
to charge self-funded residents more, or some combination of the two.  
The findings for competition and wealth offer some evidence of the influence that LA 
and provider market power potentially have on prices in the care homes market. It is 
likely that LAs have significant market power. The negative effect of wealth on the 
fees gap could be seen as indicative of LAs’ ability to dominate the market and pay 
low fees. However, it is also likely that information asymmetries allow care homes to 
employ price discrimination, which would explain the significant negative effect of 
competition on the fees gap. Whether care homes are ‘pushed’, at least to some 
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extent, into using their market power to extract rents because LAs are able to exploit 
their market power to a greater degree when provider competition is high, is 
unknown. The significant negative interaction effect between wealth and 
competition found in some specifications could certainly be indicative of this. In other 
words, there may be a ‘knock-on’ effect on the fees gap of LA market power as well 
as, or instead of, price discrimination. Potentially this could be the case since many 
care home providers will have concerns over the quality of service they provide and 
the outcomes of their residents as opposed to pure profit-making (Kendall, 2001; 
Knapp et al., 2001; Matosevic et al., 2008). That the marginal effect of competition 
on the fees gap was not significant at lower levels of wealth, i.e. where LA market 
power is likely to be high, further suggests that LAs have a very strong influence on 
local care homes markets.  
Whether LAs are purely interested in acquiring services with a minimum acceptable 
level of quality is certainly arguable. For example, incentive payments for quality are 
used in care homes in other countries and in England as well, at least to some extent 
(Malley et al., 2015; Allan & Forder, 2012). In addition, the Care Act 2014 included a 
statutory market shaping responsibility for LAs. LAs are formally tasked to promote 
a vibrant, continuously improving, market for social care with a wide variety of 
alternative forms of care. However, the extent of market shaping is difficult given 
that there are usually considered to be many social care markets within LAs, e.g. by 
type of care, location, and demand stream (Needham et al., 2018). Additionally, adult 
social care directors are increasingly looking at efficiency savings and are most 
concerned about their ability to sustain markets given budgets (ADASS, 2019).  
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As such, our results may provide some further evidence on the implications that the 
government austerity programme has had for local care homes markets. Funding 
reductions to local government have resulted in LAs using their market power to 
reduce, or not raise, the fees paid to providers, further adding to financial pressures 
that care homes are facing. To the extent that care homes have market power over 
the private segment of the market has led to increases to self-funders’ fees and a 
polarisation of services in local markets (Humphries et al., 2016). The viability of care 
home supply also becomes a concern, particularly in relatively poorer areas where 
there are larger numbers of LA-funded residents (County Councils Network and 
LaingBuisson, 2015).  
The Care Act 2014 also included reforms to the funding of social care, but these were 
subsequently scrapped with a new green paper on social care planned for a number 
of years but currently delayed (Jarrett, 2019). Included in the reforms were a ‘cap’ on 
care costs and an increase in the means-test threshold. Any reforms to the funding 
of social care that include these measures could lead to an increased cost of 
residential care to the public purse. A further consequence of changes of this type 
would be the increased bargaining power of local authorities as more people qualify 
for public support (Hancock et al., 2013). Given the former, LAs would likely to be 
increasingly squeezed on reducing costs for residential care; given the latter, LAs 
could be able to push down the price they pay for placements even further.  
There are a number of limitations to this analysis. The data limitations have already 
been outlined, although specification checks have addressed some potential 
problems. A further issue that we have not resolved fully is endogeneity; the price 
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paid for a care home place affects quality and competition levels in the local market. 
Future work could attempt to resolve this issue with the use of instruments for 
competition and quality. However, finding effective instruments that affect 
competition and quality but not price is likely to prove difficult at such an aggregated 
level of data. A potentially more prudent route for future work would be to use price 
and other data from a sample of care homes and examine market power at the care 
home level.  
 
Disclaimer 
This research was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Policy 
Research Programme (reference 103/0001). The views expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the Department of Health and Social 
Care.
1 A third, minor, stream, consists of wholly NHS-funded residents who meet continuing care criteria. 
This stream accounts for around eight per cent of all placements. We ignore this demand stream 
since pricing decisions will be based not just on care homes markets but also on hospital markets as 
local CCGs pay for continuing care. 
2 The current market has over 11,000 care homes aimed to support older people or those living with 
dementia according to registration data with CQC. For 2008 and 2010 we were further able to 
identify a home’s primary client being older people or those living with dementia. 
3 We excluded City of London as it had no care homes and amalgamated the Isles of Scilly with 
Cornwall. 
4 We used the pairwise matching method (pmm) for 20 imputations using the following variables: 
percentage of the population that is above state pension age, total care home places, average LA 
cost, the percentage of homes rated with an excellent rating, the average size of a care home, 
pension credit uptake, attendance allowance uptake, the average LA care home place price, a 
dummy variable indicating if the LA was a London borough, and the percentage of homes in each LA 
that were nursing homes, in the voluntary sector and have residents with dementia as their primary 
clients, respectively. The data were imputed across the two waves with a wave dummy included in 
the imputation model. 
5 Table A5 in the appendix shows that the average self-funder prices used in the robustness checks 
are significantly different from the preferred, adjusted average self-funder price. 
6 See Forder and Allan (2014) for more information. 
7 Care homes were rated by the CQC during this period and could attain a rating of poor, adequate, 
good or excellent.  
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Local Authorities n Mean S.D. Min 5th pc Median 95th pc Max 
Non-imputed data         
Basic 138 195.51 139.88 15.21 29.33 177.13 517.09 711.11 
Adjusted 136 180.37 143.41 0.24 16.36 145.34 461.68 805.05 
Adjusted (85% Occ.) 136 193.79 155.10 0.27 17.72 156.69 510.18 852.46 
Adjusted (95% Occ.) 136 170.05 134.72 0.22 15.33 137.99 437.87 766.88 
Adjusted (min/max) 133 173.48 138.20 3.55 18.75 142.48 445.07 823.68 
Imputed data         
Basic 5,800 162.14 146.33 15.21 15.21 117.01 516.50 711.11 
Adjusted 5,800 162.42 146.51 0.24 7.54 110.08 459.23 805.05 
Adjusted (85% Occ.) 5,800 176.43 156.97 0.27 8.06 115.57 485.70 852.46 
Adjusted (95% Occ.) 5,800 151.90 139.09 0.22 0.22 103.26 437.87 766.88 
Adjusted (min/max) 5,800 147.32 140.51 3.55 8.83 103.79 445.07 823.68 
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Local Authorities (n=290) Mean S.D Min Max 
Average Competition (HHI) 0.038     0.030    0.010     0.183 
Pension Credit Uptake (%) 25.19 8.35 9.65 57.30 
Quality (Good/Excellent %) 84.46    10.52   33.33     100 
Average care home size 38.69     9.12    25.06    99.75 
Older population (%) 18.78 4.01 7.97 29.97 
Attendance Allowance (%) 13.61 2.41 7.02 20.28 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 15.03 8.80 0 50 
Nursing home (%) 40.12     14.73    8.20         100 
Voluntary sector (%) 14.71     12.35           0          75 
London (Yes = 1) 0.19 0.39      0 1 




Table 3: Results using non-imputed data 
 1 Basic CS 2 Adjusted CS 3 Basic RE  4 Adjusted RE 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Average Competition (Log HHI) 146.31** 74.10 108.88 69.37 138.76** 70.31 118.06* 61.48 
Pension Credit (%) -10.07 16.17 -11.23 14.91 -6.88 15.10 -10.80 13.78 
Log HHI*Pension Credit -2.78 3.90 -2.06 3.76 -1.99 3.63 -1.98 3.34 
Quality (Good/Excellent %) 0.118 1.255 -0.103 1.086 0.448 1.22 0.345 1.15 
Average care home size 1.07 2.18 2.65 1.83 0.830 2.17 2.49 1.91 
Older population (%) -12.49*** 4.70 -18.97*** 3.089 -13.29*** 4.31 -20.07*** 3.05 
Attendance Allowance (%) -6.53 9.97 -9.95 6.34 -3.18 9.36 -6.97 6.48 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 1.42 1.88 1.78 1.49 1.25 1.82 1.61 1.59 
Nursing home (%) 0.051 1.152 0.703 0.973 0.356 1.11 0.606 0.988 
Voluntary sector (%) 0.499 1.284 3.93*** 1.08 0.076 1.38 3.59*** 1.10 
London (Yes = 1) 106.90*** 40.19 18.39 33.34 108.79*** 39.72 22.43 34.37 
Year 56.84*** 18.69 58.90*** 14.81 61.88*** 16.27 59.32*** 14.50 
Constant 887.82*** 325.01 885.55*** 295.57 797.85*** 325.05 72.66*** 274.57 
N (clusters)  138 (105)  136 (99)  138 (105)  136 (99)  
R2 0.423  0.666  0.418  0.663  
Wald     75.76***  164.52***  
Breusch-Pagan     6.66***  1.97*  
Hausman     7.00NS  9.38NS  








Table 4: Results using multiple imputation 
NS, *, **, and *** indicates not significant and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors control for clustering within LAs. 
 
 5 Basic RE 6 Adjusted RE 7 Adjusted RE (85% 
Occ.) 
8 Adjusted RE (95% 
Occ.) 
9 Adjusted RE 
(min/max) 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Average Competition (Log HHI) 125.88*** 47.88 108.96*** 38.65 117.74*** 38.13 105.66*** 35.56 118.56** 35.34 
Pension Credit (%) -14.86* 8.84 -17.24** 6.92 -18.29 6.92 -17.16 6.47 -21.57*** 6.36 
Log HHI*Pension Credit -3.32 2.21 -3.25* 1.72 -3.52** 1.74 -3.27** 1.62 -4.00** 1.56 
Quality (Excellent %) 0.232 0.654 0.169 0.667 0.148 0.765 0.263 0.529 0.370 0.584 
Average care home size 0.222 1.73 2.05 1.24 2.61* 1.36 1.63 1.18 1.51 1.24 
Older population (%) -14.41*** 3.41 -15.66*** 2.84 -17.05*** 3.10 -14.74*** 2.76 -14.41*** 2.57 
Attendance Allowance (%) -11.10** 5.39 -9.57** 4.20 -10.58** 4.46 -9.09** 3.67 -8.42** 3.60 
Primary client: Dementia (%) 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.05 1.29 1.08 0.911 0.990 -0.788 0.972 
Nursing home (%) 0.723 0.971 1.57* 0.87 1.42 0.896 1.57* 0.84 1.75** 0.862 
Voluntary sector (%) -0.575 0.890 2.19*** 0.75 2.25** 0.872 1.96*** 0.72 1.71** 0.70 
London (Yes = 1) 71.44** 31.50 26.62 29.28 28.53 30.54 2.60 27.33 26.26 27.42 
Year 49.81*** 12.40 39.42*** 10.45 42.93*** 10.31 38.35*** 8.91 56.55*** 9.68 
Constant 989.59*** 212.64 874.07*** 182.24 940.11*** 187.68 839.74*** 169.82 917.21*** 164.56 
N (clusters) 290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  290 (148)  
Imputations 20  20  20  20  20  
Average RVI 0.115  0.303  0.314  0.265  0.332  
Largest FMI 0.206  0.385  0.423  0.331  0.355  
Hausman 16.16NS  12.79NS  12.66NS  20.26**  20.03**  
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Table 5: Marginal effects of competition on the fees gap 
  
3 Basic RE 4 Adjusted RE 5 Basic RE 
(MI) 
6 Adjusted RE 
(MI) 
Pension credit percentile 
10th 
 
106.58*** 85.94*** 72.12*** 56.27*** 
25th 
 
102.00*** 81.37*** 64.46*** 48.77*** 
Median 
 
89.79** 69.18** 44.06** 28.78* 
75th 
 
79.24 58.66 26.45 11.52 
90th 
 
68.13 47.57 7.88 -6.68 
NS, *, **, and *** indicates not significant and significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
